University of Cincinnati Law Review
Volume 84

Issue 3

Article 2

August 2018

Brawling with the Consumer Review Site Bully
Lori A. Roberts

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr

Recommended Citation
Lori A. Roberts, Brawling with the Consumer Review Site Bully, 84 U. Cin. L. Rev. 633 (2018)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol84/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact
ronald.jones@uc.edu.

Roberts: Brawling with the Consumer Review Site Bully

BRAWLING WITH THE CONSUMER REVIEW SITE BULLY

Lori A. Roberts*
Introduction ..........................................................................................
634
I. "B illion D ollar Bully". .....................................................................
639
II. Brawling With The Bully ................................................................
648
A. Futile Responsive Litigation Tactics .................................... 649
1. The Communications Decency Act of 1996: Safe
H arbor to the Bully .................................................
649
2. Unmasking the Identity of Anonymous Reviewers ..653
3. Anti-SLAPP Laws .....................................................
656
B. Futile Proactive Preclusion Tactics ....................................... 658
1. California A .B . 2365 .................................................
659
2. The Consumer Review Freedom Act of 2014 ........... 661
III. A Proposal to Enforce Non-Disparagement Clauses in
Consum er Contracts ..................................................................
662
IV . C onclusion .....................................................................................
669
Abstract
John Palmer ordered two small items-totaling less
than $20-from KlearGear.com.1 The items never
2 After he and his wife unsuccessfully
arrived.
attempted to contact KlearGearby phone and email
to resolve the claim, KlearGear ultimately cancelled
the order claiming that it had not been paid.
Palmer's wife posted a review on RipoffReport.com,
criticizing the inaccessibility of KlearGear's
3
customer service and their handling of the claim.
More than three years later, the couple received a
demandfrom KlearGear to remove the online review
and to pay $3,500 for violating a non-disparagement
clause in its Terms of Use.4
Palmer notified
*Professor of Law at Western State College of Law. The Author wishes to extend deep gratitude to her
colleagues for their conversation, comments and feedback on early versions of this Article: Professor
Paula Manning, Professor Elizabeth Jones, and Professor Monica Todd. The Author also wishes to
acknowledge the outstanding research assistance of reference librarian Scott Frey, and student research
assistant (Western State '16) Larissa Parker.
1. Complaint at 4, Palmer v. KlearGear (D. Utah 2013) (No. 1:13-cv-00175).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 5.
4. Id. at 5-6 (To complete an order on KlearGear.com, the consumer was required to
electronically "check" a box on the website next to the statement, "I have read and agree to the
KlearGear.com Terms of Sale." The Terms appeared on a separate webpage accessible via a web link.
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KlearGear that the subject clause had not appeared
in the terms of service at the time he placed his order,
and moreover that he did not write the review, his
wife did.
He also notified KlearGear that
RipoffReport.com had a policy of not removing online
reviews, so his wife did not have control over the
current posting.5 Palmer refused to pay the $3,500
fine and KlearGear reported the debt to credit
reporting agencies, ultimately marring Palmer's
credit.6 Palmerfiled suit againstKlearGearseeking
a declarationthat no debt was owedfor violating the
non-disparagement clause.7
KlearGear did not
respond to the lawsuit and in May 2014, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Utah granted
Palmer a default judgment. Palmer was awarded
$102,250 in compensatory damages, $204,500 in
punitive damages,plus costs and attorneys 'fees. 8
INTRODUCTION

John Palmer has become the face of consumer justice and free speech
on the Internet, and his story is at the center of nearly every news article
decrying the perils of underhanded businesses slipping nondisparagement clauses into consumer contracts, effectively silencing
consumers' "right to Yelp!"
The Utah District Court's decision
showcases the particularly unscrupulous business practice of inserting a
new term into a consumer contract after the contract has been fulfilled,
then suing to enforce the new term. In doing so, however, the court did
not slecifically address the validity of the non-disparagement clause
itself. Indeed, while non-disparagement clauses are typically analyzed
under traditional contract law, limited judicial precedent has been
amassed specifically addressing the .validity of a non-disparagement
agreement in this context. Nonetheless, John Palmer's case has
spawned outrage at the idea of muzzling online consumer feedback and
has inspired state and federal legislation to halt the use of nondisparagement clauses altogether in consumer contracts.
The non-disparagement clause was found within those terms and forbade KlearGear's customers from
"taking any action that negatively impacts KlearGear.com, its reputation, products, services,
management or employees").
5. Id. at 6.
6. Complaint, supranote 1, at 7, 6.
7. 1d. at 11.
8. Id.
9. See id.
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Unfortunately, the social media backlash against KlearGear's novel
attempt to silence consumer feedback has mostly failed to consider
scenarios in which a non-disparagement clause in a consumer contract
might be a justifiable business practice. That is, while KlearGear
epitomized an unscrupulous business, little acknowledgement has been
paid to the fact that unscrupulous consumers exist too: consumers who
use the power to post a negative online review as leverage to negotiate
free and discounted products or services or individuals who have never
purchased the product or used the service write false or misleading
online reviews to hurt competitors or because they have some other
selfish motive with the business owner.
There is no question that consumer review sites1 ° have had a profound
effect on business practices and the impact of reviews posted on these
sites can make-or-break a small business.1 1 The derisive advice to a
business owner plagued by negative reviews to "improve your product
or service and you won't get crappy reviews" is useless when a false or
misleading review is posted anonymously or by a person that the
business cannot confirm ever purchased the product or used the service.
Business decisions are not based on one or two anonymous negative
reviews; yet just one negative review can quickly devastate a small
business' overall rating. Moreover, dodgy customers hoping to make
the most of a small grievance against a business-or perhaps no
grievance at all-threaten to post a bad review in return for discounted
or free products or services.
Few practical options exist for small businesses to effectively respond
to false or misleading reviews or thwart those customers-who wield
the power to write a bad review-seeking to blackmail small business
owners. The internal policies of consumer review sites are generally
designed to maximize the total number of users and reviews, and in-turn
sell advertising at a profit, without regard to the accuracy of any
particular review or even ensuring that the reviewer has purchased the

10. For purposes of this Article, the term "consumer review sites" refers to the broad range of
crowd-sourced online consumer review sites. Although not all consumer review sites have identical
internal policies, many sites have similar policies for purposes of their use in this article. See infra Part I
(outlining the internal policies of consumer review sites).
11. See id. (outlining the economic impact on businesses of consumer review site ratings); see
also HBS Study Finds Positive Yelp Reviews Boost Business, HARV. MAG. (Oct. 5, 2011),
http://harvardmagazine.com/201 1/ 10/hbs-study-finds-positive-yelp-reviews-lead-to-increased-business
(concluding that each one-star increase in Yelp! user ratings boost revenue from 5-9%); see Gregory
Ferenstein, Berkeley Study: Half-Star Change in Yelp Rating Can Make or Break a Restaurant, TECH
CRUNCH (Sept. 2, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/09/02/berkeley-study-half-star-change-in-yelprating-can-make-or-break-a-restaurant/ (noting that San Francisco restaurants are almost 50% more
likely to sell out evening reservations with a half-start upgrade to their Yelp! rating); Judith A. Chevalier
& Dina Mayzlin, The Effect of Word of Mouth on Sales: Online Book Reviews, 43 J. OF MKTG. RES.
345, 345 (2006) (finding that positive online reviews positively impact book sales).
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product or used the service. 12 Indeed, many consumer review sites have
no procedures at all to assure readers or the businesses being reviewed
13
that the alleged consumer reviews are from actual customers.
Additionally, the sites have no motivation to vet these reviews since the
broad immunity of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA)14
insulates them from claims related to content on their sites.
Furthermore, based on policy of protecting speech important to the
15
public, a business cannot delist itself from a consumer review site.
While a reviewed business can generally respond in writing on the site,
such response may serve only to draw more unwanted attention to the
false or misleading negative posting.16 Finally, once a review is posted
on a consumer review site, its removal is nearly impossible.' 7 With
these internal policies in place, protection of anonymous defamation and
libel under the guise of free speech is the effect.
Legal recourse for claims of defamation against an online reviewer is
generally futile because reviewers post comments anonymously and
unmasking the identify of an anonymous reviewer is a circular--often
losing-battle with state procedures that require a business to prove the
statement is false, without knowing the complainer's identity.18 AntiSLAPP laws 19 make legitimate claims against a reviewer treacherous

12. See infra Part I (discussing typical internal policies of consumer review sites). Posting
guidelines found on consumer review websites generally provide that only people who have purchased
the product or used the service should write a review, and admonish people to not post false or
misleading information, but the sites have no internal policies of ensuring that these guidelines are
actually followed in practice. See, e.g., Content Guidelines, YELP!, http://www.yelp.com/guidelines
(last visited Jan. 3, 2016); How it works, ANGIE'S LIST, http://www.angieslist.com/how-itworks.htm/?CID=HowltWorksSitelinkBing&s kwcid=AL!3718! 10!378998443 !20408574619&ef id=
U1GRmgAABZA-hMgz:20150706182201:s (last visited Jan. 3, 2016); Guidelines, TRIP ADVISOR,
https://www.tripadvisorsupport.com/hc/en-us/categories/200056887 (last visited Jan. 3, 2016); Review
and photo policies, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/business/answer/2622994?hl=en (last visited
Jan.
3,
2016);
Customer
Review
Creation
Guidelines,
AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/community-help/customer-reviews-guidelines (last visited Jan. 3, 2016).
13. For an example of this, see the consumer review policies discussed in supra note 12.
14. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1996).
15. See supra note 12.
16. See T.C., What is the StreisandEffect?, THE ECONOMIST: THE ECONOMIST EXPLAINS (Apr.
15, 2013, 11:50 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economistexplains-what-streisand-effect (describing that efforts to suppress online information can backfire and
end-up drawing more attention to the would-be-censored information; dubbed the "Streisand Effect"
after the famous singer sued California Coastal Records for posting images of her Malibu home online,
the suit drew attention and caused many more viewers to see the pictures that Streisand wanted to be
kept private than otherwise would have bothered to browse through the CCRP's archives).
17. See e.g., Kenton Hutcherson, How To Remove Ripoff Reports from Google, Not Just Bury
Them, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Feb. 24, 2011), http://searchengineland.com/how-to-remove-ripoffreports-from-google-not-just-bury-them-65173 (explaining the frustrating and helpless feeling in trying
to get a negative review removed from Ripoffreport.com).
18. See infra Part ll(A)(3) (outlining the challenges in navigating states' unmasking statutes).
19. Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) are lawsuits brought to discourage
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because, if unsuccessful, the losing plaintiff may be exposed to onerous
costs and fees. 20 Litigation against the consumer review site has proven
to be an imprudent response as well because consumer review sites are
well insulated from liability under the CDA for the accuracy of
information posted on their sites. 21 The only real option for many
businesses is to resolve to "play along"-to pay for advertising on each
consumer review site and thus "work with" the consumer review site
itself to enhance positive feedback and remove negative reviews as just
another cost of doing business in the Internet age. It is this reality that
22
has earned Yelp! the moniker: "Billion Dollar Bully."
Frustrated by the internal policies of consumer review sites and the
impracticability of legal recourse, some businesses have gone on the
offensive to preempt negative reviews to which they cannot effectively
respond by incorporating non-disparagement clauses to their terms and
conditions for a purchase or service, effectively barring any negative
consumer comments. In response to this tactic precluding negative
reviews, California recently enacted legislation that voids most nondisparagement clauses in consumer contracts-even those that may be
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered into-and similar
federal legislation is pending in a House of Representatives
subcommittee. 23 In the meantime, an anti-SLAPP bill was introduced in
Congress in May 2015.24 Unsurprisingly, Yelp! supports these bills.25
Like Wicked's rendition of The Wizard of Oz-where the playwright
tells the well-known story from the perspective of the misunderstood
witch from the Land of Oz 26 -the first goal of this Article is to
reexamine the relationship between consumer review sites, reviewers,
and the businesses being reviewed. Secondly, this Article outlines the
obstacles to productive litigation as an option for a small business to
respond to false or misleading online reviews, and also the difficulty in
precluding false or misleading reviews from being circulated online in
the first place. Acknowledging the critical importance of free speech
and public debate, the policies behind anti-SLAPP laws, and the
or keep people from speaking out on issues of public interest. See infra Part II(A)(3) (outlining state
anti-SLAPP laws and penalties).
20. See infra Part II(A)(3) (outlining state anti-SLAPP laws and penalties).
21. See infra Part II(A)(2) (outlining the CDA); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1998).
22. See infra Part I.
23. H.R. 2110, 114th Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/ll4th-congress/housebill/21 10/text; see also CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1680 (2015).
24. The
SPEAK
FREE
Act
of 2015,
H.R.
2304,
114th
Cong.
(2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2304/text).
25. Laurent Crenshaw, Freedom of Speech Deserves Better FederalProtection, YELP! OFFICIAL
BLOG (May 15, 2015, 10:48:03 AM), http://officialblog.yelp.com/2015/05/freedom-of-speech-deservesbetter-federal-protection.html).
26. WICKED, THE MUSICAL, http://media.wickedthemusical.com (last visited July 11, 2016).
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universally bad public policy of enabling businesses to offer inferior
products and service while secretly tucking non-disparagement clauses
into their terms of service, this Article proposes a solution that includes
enforcement of non-disparagement clauses in consumer contracts. Such
clauses can be analyzed under traditional contract law and do not violate
public policy where concrete procedural and substantive safeguards
exist, such as those found in other contexts where constitutional rights
are contractually waived. This Article concludes that a blanket void of
non-disparagement clauses in consumer contracts is a mistaken
legislative response as it leaves small businesses with few responsive,
and even fewer preemptive, options to deal with the issues of false and
misleading reviews posted on consumer review sites.
Part I of this Article explores the seedy underbelly of crowd-sourced
consumer review sites through an examination of the general business
models and common internal policies of consumer review sites,
including allegations of extortionist advertising policies, review
manipulation, and review fabrication. As a particular example, Yelp!'s
nefarious relationship with small businesses is detailed. 7
Part II of this Article outlines the treacherous legal landscape and the
limited responsive and preemptive options for businesses brawling with
the consumer review site bullies. Litigation to quell false or misleading
reviews is staged against the backdrop of seemingly insurmountable
procedural safeguards to protect the identity of anonymous reviewers,
anti-SLAPP laws, the CDA, and recently enacted and proposed state and
federal legislation that void non-disparagement provisions in consumer
sales and service agreements, as against public policy. This Article
demonstrates that attempting litigating against often anonymous
reviewers making false or misleading statements about products and
services on consumer review sites, or against the consumer review sites
themselves, is futile. In some cases, legislative protections of free
speech and open debate are stifling litigation intended to impede
destructive defamation. Instead, these legislative measures facilitate a
business model reliant on dissemination of content, regardless of its
accuracy. Small businesses are particularly vulnerable to the consumer
review site bullies. Suing an online reviewer for defamation, while an
option, is often challenging, cost prohibitive for small businesses, and
too time consuming to offer relief from the immediate effect of a
negative online review. Small businesses, with perhaps only a few
reviews overall, cannot bury a false or misleading review with hundreds
of others the way larger business can.
Part III of this Article proposes that non-disparagement clauses in
27. Prost

Prods.,

Inc.,

Billion Dollar Bully

Trailer, YouTUBE

(Mar.

7,

2015),

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-12dkJctUDIs [hereinafter Billion Dollar Bully Trailer].
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consumer contracts that preclude consumers from posting negative
reviews on consumer review sites should not be subject to a blanket
legislative void as against public policy. In light of the current legal
landscape and the reality of the relationship between consumer review
sites, individual reviewers, and the businesses being reviewed, such
legislation is too broad in prohibiting non-disparagement clauses in all
circumstances. This Article examines conventional contract principles
that typically uphold contracts of silence, including contracts that waive
constitutional rights in other contexts in order to support the right of
consumers and businesses to contract for silence as part of a consumer
contract. The business justifications for non-disparagement clauses are
explored and this Article suggests that concrete standards for such
clauses in consumer contracts would be practical to both implement and
enforce.
This Article concludes the legal landscape for small businesses
attempting to respond to or preclude false or misleading online reviews
should reflect the practical business landscape. The effect of permitting
non-disparagement clauses in consumer contracts will not further the
unsavory public policy of enabling unscrupulous businesses to offer
inferior service while secretly tucking a non-disparagement agreement
into their terms of service. Rather, by evaluating these clauses under
standard contract principles, and in tandem with other suggested
changes, it will improve the integrity of consumer review sites. In this
way, consumers' rights to share honest experiences can be maintained
and small businesses can be released from the consumer review sites'
bullying scheme.
I. "BILLION DOLLAR BULLY"

In March 2015, Prost Films launched a Kickstarter campaign to
develop a documentary titled Billion Dollar Bully, exposing Yelp!'s
"$3.6 billion racket" of aggressive advertising techniques, and review
manipulation and fabrication, amounting to what the film's developer
calls "extortion against small business owners." 28 The two-minute
Kickstarter campaign video alleges that Yelp! 's business model includes
a practice of manipulating consumer reviews by hiding businesses'
positive reviews and highlighting negative ones in an effort to extort
advertising money from the reviewed businesses, and ultimately holding
the businesses' reputation hostage via their privileged algorithmic
filters.29
28. Prost Productions, Inc., The Billion Dollar Bully, KICKSTARTER (May 19, 2015),
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1299637435/billion-dollar-bully.
29. See Billion DollarBully Trailer,supra note 27.
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The cry from many small businesses supports the premise of the

documentary: If a business does not pay for advertising on a consumer

review site, positive reviews are filtered out and mysterious negative

reviews appear; if a business does advertise, positive reviews are
highlighted and the negative reviews disappear; reviewers "shake down"
businesses for discounts and freebies with the threat of negative reviews;
consumer review sites do not ensure that reviews are written by actual
customers; an anonymous negative review will remain, even if it
appears to be written by someone who has never purchased the product
or used the service. Indeed, social media, blogs, and article comments

indicate an untold number of small businesses suffering from false or

unfair reviews and conducting business under the constant veiled threats
of a "bad review." 30 The legal protections that insulate dishonest

anonymous reviewers and dis-incentivize consumer review sites from

implementing protections to avoid misuses of the site, further
corroborate these complaints. 3 ' Prost's Kickstarter campaign went

"viral" in part by small businesses that were fed-up with Yelp!'s
manipulation of their businesses' online reputation.32 Yelp! shares were
down 4% in afternoon trade on March 19, 2015, just three days after the

The film's developer met and
Kickstarter campaign launched.3 3
exceeded the $90,000 goal in less than two weeks.34
However, even if Prost's claims in Billion DollarBully are accurate,
they do not amount to extortion according to the Ninth Circuit.3 5 The

Ninth Circuit recently upheld a district court's "dismissal of an action by
30. See Lauren Orsini, Yelp's Rocky Relationship With Small Businesses, MEDIA SHIFT (Jan. 29,
2013), http://mediashift.org/2013/01/yelps-rocky-relationship-with-small-business029/; see also L.
David Russell, Fake It Until You Make It, Battling Fake Online Reviews, LAW 360 (June 9, 2014, 12:17
PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/545366/fake-it-until-you-make-it-battling-fake-online-reviews.
31. See infra Part II (outlining the challenges faced by businesses in overcoming the CDA, antiSLAPP laws, and unmasking statutes to sue individual reviewers or consumer review sites for false or
misleading reviews.).
32. See e.g., BOTTO BISTRO, www.bottobistro.com (last visited Feb. 24, 2016). A Richmond,
California restaurant with a tag line: "Authentic Tuscan cooking with attitude, also specializing in
getting the worst reviews on Yelp!" promotes Prost's campaign on their website; the restaurant proudly
advertises that they are: "the shame and the disgrace of the Yelp[!] community. Our restaurant is so
awful that Yelp[!] has decided to remove over 2200 one star reviews from our account because we made
their site look bad. Yes we are that bad. Shame on us! Still, we made mama proud!" The restaurant
even promotes: "HATE US ON YELP[!]; Give us a ONE star on Yelp[!] and get 50% OFF any pizza.
(Take a screenshot with your phone to show it to us and redeem your discount)... We also reward the
most funny and sarcastic one star review of the month with Free ticket for our cooking class!").
33. See Myles Udland, Yelp Shares are Getting Whacked and Traders are Pointing to this
2:22 PM),
Documentary Project on Kickstarter, Bus. INSIDER (Mar. 19, 2015,
http://www.businessinsider.com/yelp-billion-dollar-bully-documentary-2015-3#ixzz3ZCGlaRqB.
About this project, KICKSTARTER,
34. Prost Productions, Inc., Billion Dollar Bully:
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1299637435/billion-dollar-bully/description (last visited Apr. 26,
2016).
35. See Levitt v. Yelp!, 765 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2014).
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small business owners alleging that Yelp! Inc. extorted advertising
payments from them by manipulating user reviews and penning negative
reviews of their business." 36 Thus, in Levitt v. Yelp!, a group of small
business owners each alleged that Yelp! created negative reviews of
their businesses and manipulated review and rating content to induce
them to purchase advertising on the site. 3 For example, one business
alleged that after declining advertising services, certain positive ratings
were removed from the site. 38 Another business alleged that anonymous
negative reviews started appearing on the site, accompanied by
aggressive advertising sales calls by Yelp! offering to "hide negative
reviews" if the business purchased advertising. 39 One business owner,
after purchasing advertising, found that her business's positive reviews
were restored days later.4 °
However, explaining the "stringent
requirements" of stating a claim for extortionate business practices
under California's Unfair Competition Law, the court stated that "unless
a person has a pre-existing right to be free of the threatened economic
harm, threatening economic harm to induce a person to pay for a
legitimate service is not extortion." 4 1 The court reasoned that "Yelp[!]'s
manipulation of user reviews, assuming it occurred, was not wrongful
use of economic fear ', 42 even though "[b]usinesses cannot opt out of
being listed on Yelp." 43 The Ninth Circuit further held that business
owners had insufficient specific facts from which the court could infer
that Yelp! actually penned the negative reviews. The business owners
claimed no records of doing the work cited in the review and that the
names of the users did not match the names of customers. 45 However,
the court held "even if a particular review was not accurate as to the
work done or the customer's name, the inaccuracy does not make it
plausible that it was Yelp!-as opposed to a competitor, or a disgruntled
customer hiding behind an alias, or an angry neighbor, just to give a few
possibilities-that authored the offending review., 46 The court also
noted that since "Yelp! has the right to charge for legitimate advertising
services, the [alleged] threat of economic harm .. . is, at most, hard
47
bargaining."
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 1127.
Id.
Id. at 1127-28.
Levitt, 765 F.3d at 1128.
Id. at 1131.
Id.
Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1135
Levitt, 765 F.3d at 1136.
Id.
Id. at 1134.
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Yelp! is a behemoth in the consumer review site arena. Founded in
2004, Yelp! has 142 million unique monthly visitors, over 77 million
user reviews, and 2.1 million claimed local businesses. 48 Over 90,000
local businesses advertise on Yelp! 49 bringing the total revenue for the
first quarter of 2015 to over $118 million. 0 With these distinctions,
Yelp! has an impact on a business' bottom line that cannot be
understated: a- Harvard Business School study found that "a one-star
increase in [a] Yelp! rating leads to [between] a five-to-nine percent
increase in revenue., 51 Yelp! itself publicizes that "[a]n extra half-star
rating causes restaurants to sell out 19 percentage points more frequently
(increase from 30% to 49% of the time), and up to 27 percentage points
more frequently when alternate information is more scarce (e.g., Yelp!
is the only source of information about the business.)" 52 Confirming the
disproportionate impact that consumer review sites have on small
businesses, the study further showed that although such ratings had no
appreciable effect on large businesses such as chain restaurants, the
ratings had a very significant impact on small businesses.5 3

Despite fiscal influence on small businesses, the internal policies of
many consumer review sites do not demonstrate responsible control
over their processes. Philosophically, the business model of most
consumer-sourced review sites is admirable: the majority center around
an online hosted site that allows visitors to search a directory of local
businesses and read reviews written by other people, post their own
reviews of businesses, and rank businesses. 54 While some consumer
review sites require registration prior to posting a review, it is generally
free for a customer to submit a review-positive or negative-and can
be submitted anonymously, with no process for confirming that the
reviewer has actually purchased the product or used the service being
reviewed. 55 Businesses cannot opt-out of being listed and reviewed on
48. Craig Smith, By the Numbers: 45 Amazing Yelp Statistics, DMR (Nov. 24, 2015),
http://expandedramblings.com/index.php/yelp-statistics/.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. HBS Study Finds Positive Yelp Reviews Boost Business, HARv. MAG. (Oct. 5, 2011),

http://harvardmagazine.com/2011/10/hbs-study-finds-positive-yelp-reviews-lead-to-increased-business.
52. Damell, New Study Reinforces the Value of Yelp for Businesses, YELP! OFFICIAL BLOG

(Sept. 17, 2012), http://officialblog.yelp.com/2012/09/new-study-reinforces-the-value-of-yelp-forbusinesses.html.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., YELP!, supra note 12 (guidelines do not require any evidence of purchase of
product or use of service being reviewed); ANGIES LIST, supra note 12 (guidelines do not require any
evidence of purchase of product or use of service being reviewed); TRIPADVISOR SUPPORT, supra note
12 (guidelines do not require any evidence of purchase of product or use of service being reviewed);
GOOGLE, supra note 12; AMAZON, supra note 12 (guidelines require evidence of some purchase of
product on Amazon, but not the actual product or service being reviewed).
55. See YELP!, supranote 12.
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these for-profit consumer review sites. 56 Some consumer-review sites
do not have policies that permit removal of reviews, even by the original
poster, and even where the business 57can demonstrate a high likelihood
that the review is false or misleading.
There is no motivation for online consumer review sites to improve
their policies to ensure only honest feedback by actual customers
because the CDA insulates the consumer review site from liability for
any statements made on their site. 58 The motivation of a consumer
review site is profit garnered from advertising, and advertising prices are
increased by the number of visitors, reviews, and site members, not the
accuracy of the information on the site. However, fueled by the media
splash of Billion Dollar Bully, the seedy underbelly of crowd-sourced
user review websites is gradually being acknowledged.
The Internet is littered with informal complaints by businesses
alleging shakedown-type advertising tactics, corrupt filtering of positive
reviews unless and until a business agrees to pay for premium
advertising, and complaints that Yelp! is resistant to implementing
policies to deal with consumer-led intimidation and blackmailing. To
say that Yelp! has a rocky relationship with small businesses is an
understatement. 59 There is a Facebook page "presented as a place for
businesses who have been harmed by Yelp!'s malicious review policies"
with over 1500 "likes" and a myriad of business owners claiming that
same story of sabotage over and over: "Yelp! offers to hide negative
60
customer reviews of their businesses on its web site... for a price."
Moreover, Yelp! has been referred to as a "Modem Day Digital
Mafia," 61 there is a YouTube video "dedicated to businesses expressions
that Yelp sucks" 62 and another satirical video depicts "what if Yelp were

56. See id.
57. Id.
See
also
Arbitration
Program,
RIPOFF
REPORT,
http://www.ripoffreport.com/Arbitration.aspxhttp://www.ripoffreport.com/Arbitration.aspx (last visited
Feb. 24, 2016). Ripoffreport.com does not allow edit or removal of a review, even by the original
author; a business who wishes to challenge a posted review as false must agree to the "VIP Arbitration"
rules that require the business to provide Ripoff Report with three things "1.) a signed copy of the
Arbitration Agreement; 2.) a complete copy of your Arbitration Statement including any and all
supporting evidence, such as documents or Witness Statements (subject to limitations which are
discussed in detail in the Program Rules) you want the Arbitrator to review; and 3.) a check for the
[$2,000] arbitration fee ....No arbitration matter will begin until we receive all of these things."
58. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(l)-(2) (2015).
59. See generally Orsini, supra note 30; see also L. David Russell, supra note 30.
60. Yelp
Sucks!
Businesses
Fight Back,
FACEBOOK
(Apr.
24,
2013),
https://www.facebook.com/pages/YELP-Sucks-Businesses-Fight-Back/263402807082326.
61. Alexandra Myers, Does Yelp Advertising Suck? The Modern Day Digital Mafia, THE SERV.
COACH (Oct. 21 2013), http://theservicecoach.com/does-yelp-suck-the-modem-day-digital-mafia/.
62. Yelp Sucks - Yelp Really Sucks!, Yelp Review Filter VS. Yelp Filters Reviews, YOtJTUBE
(June 16,2012), https://www.youtube.com/user/YelpSucks.
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real life."6 3
The great irony of potential consumers looking to consumer review

sites for honest reviews is that their trust is misplaced. Reports indicate
that about 20% of all Yelp reviews are fake. 64

There is a thriving

business of "reputation management firms" posting paid-for positive
reviews as well. Despite their lack of response to the problem of fake
negative reviews, consumer review sites have taken great pains to make

sure that the fake positive reviews are removed.

Yelp! touts an

"astroturfing filter," a proprietary algorithm to filter-out fake reviewskept secret to avoid "gaming the system"-but the algorithm itself is the
source of much controversy. Businesses claim that it in some cases
simply filters out positive reviews as a guise to convince small
businesses to advertise with Yelp!.66
Perhaps most egregious is that the value of a business' online
reputation, coupled with the lack of procedures assuring only honest
reviews by actual customers on consumer review sites, gives
unscrupulous individuals the opportunity to intimidate and blackmail
businesses for free or discounted products or services with the threat of a
poor review.67 Consumers are well aware of their social media clout and
the lengths businesses will go to avoid a negative review, with some
willing to take advantage of that position. 68 Social media blackmailing
is a real problem for businesses, particularly small businesses whose
ratings would be vulnerable to just one or two negative postings and
63. Adryenn Ashley, What If Yelp! Were Real Life, YELP-SUCKS.COM, http://yelpsucks.com/what-if-yelp-were-real-life.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2016).
64. Jacob Siegel, 20% of All Yelp Reviews are Reviews Are Written by Paid Shills, BGR (Sept.
25, 2013, 11:15 PM), http://bgr.com/2013/09/25/fake-yelp-reviews/.
65. See Kaitlin A. Dohse, Note, Fabricating Feedback: Blurring the Line Between Brand
Managementand Bogus Reviews, 13 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 363, 374 (2013).
66. See id. See also Levitt v. Yelp, 765 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2014) (a group of small
business owners each alleged that Yelp! created negative reviews of their businesses and manipulated
review and rating content to induce them to purchase advertising on the site); Yelp Inc. v. Catron, 70 F.
Supp. 3d 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Beth Winegamer, Yelp[!] Must Pay Law Firm's Fees In Fake-Review
Case, LAW360 (Nov. 25, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/491464/yelp-must-pay-lawfirm-s-fees-in-fake-review-CASE (discussing Yelp Inc. v. McMillan Law Group Inc., No. CGC 13533654 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2013)).
67. See Charles Passey, I Complained Online and Got $1200 Back, MKT. WATCH (Aug. 28,
2014, 2:47 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/i-complained-online-and-got-1200-back-2014-0731.
68. See Jill Kransey, Restaurant Goers Are Turning To Yelp To Blackmail Owners For Lousy
Service, BUS. INSIDER, http://www.businessinsider.com/restaurant-goers-are-using-yelp-to-blackmailowners-for-lousy-service-2012-5#ixzz3hy2rNlZk; see also Yelp Extortion: Sacramento Man Tries To
Blackmail Restaurant With Bad Review, HUFFINGTON POST (May 30, 2012, 1:04 PM),
A customer
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/30/yelp-extortion-sacramento-n-1556207.html.
threatened to post a negative review on Yelp! of Red Rabbit Kitchen and Bar unless the owner agreed to
pay him $100; the customer alleged that he got food poisoning after dining at the restaurant. The owner
said that although there was no way to substantiate the man's claim, he had, at which point the man
demanded $100.
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lack a legal department to respond.
After involuntarily being listed and reviewed, with no assurances that
reviews are by individuals who have actually purchased the product or
used the service, and no assurance that other real reviews have not been
filtered from view by the consumer review site's secret astroturfing
program, a business has ffw out-of-court responsive options 69 including:
changing the product or business practices complained of online,
responding to the reviewer on the consumer review site, or paying for
advertising on the consumer review site and hope for the best.
A vapid justification for the current consumer review site business
model is that online reviews can help businesses gain valuable insight
into the consumer experience and even strengthen customer
relationships through the online exchange. 70 Reasoning that online
feedback is valuable and relevant, the contention is that "[a] major
purpose of reviews is to create an effective consumer feedback loop:
consumers use a product or service, and then review it online or
elsewhere, so that other consumers can take those reviews into
That is, a business can respond to negative online
consideration.'
feedback with changes and improvements that can then be reviewed
again, with improved ratings. However, that goal is undermined when
the reviewer is anonymous and the feedback is possibly not from a real
customer. A rational business does not make truly meaningful changes
to its products, service, or policies based on one or two anonymous
negative reviews, even though those reviews can have a devastating
effect on a small business's reputation and revenue.72 In a large
company with thousands of reviews, a few false-and perhaps
negative-reviews are lost in the sea of honest reviews, giving
consumers an overall more honest view of the product or service. But
for a small business, with few reviews, one negative review can make a
big difference. Thus, advising a business to simply provide an excellent
product or service so that it need not worry about negative online
reviews, fails to take into account the reality of the consumer review
sites' policies.
Some businesses may respond in writing to reviewers' ratings and
reviews on the site. The drawbacks to this are many, including that a
69. See infra Part 11(discussing litigation options).
70. Ann Marie Marciarille, How's My Doctoring?PatientFeedback Role In Assessing Physician
Quality, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 361, 367, 370-71 (2012) (exploring concepts of whether
patients are consumers and doctors are service providers, arguing that online patient feedback is
valuable and relevant because the modem patient-physician relationship is sufficiently commercial such
that reputational information is amenable to information in this format).
71. Daniel Castro & Laura Drees, Why We Need FederalLegislation To ProtectPublic Speech
Online at 4, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (2015), http://www2.itif.org/2015-anti-slapp.pdf.
72. See Part I (outlining the fiscal effect of consumer review site ratings on small businesses).
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response to a negative or misleading review may draw more unwanted
attention to that review. 73 Ironically, while consumer review sites
generally have no policy for ensuring that a review is written by an
actual customer, a business can only respond to a review if the business
is "claimed" and the consumer review site is able to authenticate that the
person leaving the response is actually permitted to do so. 74 Thus,
before a business can respond to a review, a business must be "claimed"
by providing identifying information and confirming that the responder
has the right to represent the business, and "click the button" to agree to
the consumer review site's Terms of Service, 75 including choice of law,
indemnity, disclaimer and use restrictions.76

Some businesses are not permitted to respond to online criticism at all
because, unlike restaurants and hotels, businesses that employ
physicians, lawyers and other professionals may not be able to discuss a
particular client's care due to confidentiality concerns. For example,
while doctor review sites permit the possibility that anonymous and
damaging comments to their reputation and practice may be written by
"[a] competitor[], disgruntled ex-employees, or anyone else with an axe
to grind,,

77

a doctor generally cannot discuss a patient's care due to

medical privacy laws. 78 This limits a physician's ability to respond to

73. See T.C., supra note 16 (discussing the Streisand effect).
74. id.
75. Terms of Service, YELP! (Nov. 27, 2012), https://www.yelp.com/static?count-y=US&p=tos.
76. See e.g., Guidelinesfor Business Owners, YELP!, https://biz.yelp.com/ (guidelines permit
business written response to online reviews after the business is "claimed"); ANGIE'S LIST, supra note
12 (guidelines permit business written responses to online reviews, but must be submitted through the
Business Center website and can be done after the business has created a free account and logged in);
Management Response Guidelines, TRIP ADVISOR SUPPORT, https://www.tripadvisorsupport.com/hc/enus/articles/200614337-Management-Response-Guideline (last visited Feb. 25, 2016) (guidelines permit
written response to online reviews after business is "claimed" and an account is set up through the
Management
Center);
Reply
to
Reviews,
GOOGLE,
https://support.google.com/business/answer/6001256?hl=en&reftopic=6001257 (last visited Feb. 25,
2016);
Customer
Review
Creation
Guidelines,
AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref-amb-link_47889982_1?ie=UTF8&nodeld=
201602680&pf rd m=ATVPDKIKXODER&pf rd s=center1&pfrd~r=0FWHQ83SCOAAAVTDCT8&pf rdt--7001&pf rd_p=2338627022&pf rd i=customerreviews-guidelines (guidelines permit anyone to respond in writing to online reviews, and "a person
officially associated with a product, such as the manufacturer, has the additional ability to add a
highlighted comment," but this is permitted only if Amazon can verify that it comes from "an
authenticated creator of the product").
77. Sean D. Lee, I Hate My Doctor: Reputation, Defamation, andPhysician Review Websites, 23
HEALTH MATRIX 573, 574 (2013) (acknowledging the practice of false and misleading reviews of
physicians, and arguing for extrajudicial solution of monitoring online profiles, establishing a positive
online identify and accepting the realities of negative online reviews).
78. Marciarille, supra note 70, at 361, 402 (citing AMA Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 8.03:
Conflict of Interest ("Under no circumstances may physicians place their own financial interests above
the welfare of their patients. The primary objective of the medical profession is to render service to
humanity: reward or financial gain is a subordinate consideration.")).
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online criticism. 79 Other professional services like lawyers similarly
bear the same impact of false, negative, or misleading reviews with
limited responsive options.80 While an attorney is not wholly precluded
from responding to online criticism, they are barred from disclosing
confidential information about the client's matter, seriously restricting
the detail with which a response can be formulated8.
A final option for businesses imperiled by false or misleading
negative reviews is to "play along" with the consumer review site's
profit model as just another cost of doing business. Indeed, businesses
have the option of entering into advertising agreements with the
consumer review sites, making their ad appear on competitors' pages,
and removing ads purchased by other businesses from their review
page.82 Consumer review sites do not suggest that paid advertising with
them will result in better customer service for purposes of removing
false negative reviews and making positive ones reappear, but the
implication from untold number of online bloggers with firsthand
that is precisely the sales strategy of their
experience suggests
83
advertising agents.

Consumer review sites may be sorely misunderstood giants who
cannot shake the persistent extortionist mafia persona. Regardless, the
79. See id. at 402.
80. Id. at 364, 377 (discussing that doctors, like other small business owners looking to protect
their reputation and practice, are increasingly suing and being met with the same road-blocks to justice;
defamation suits are as unpractical in a patient-doctor context as in any other business-customer context
because the same issues of reviewer anonymity and strong free speech protections win out); see also
Laurel A. Rigertas, How Do You Rate Your Lawyer? Lawyers' Responses to Online Reviews of Their
Services, 4 ST. MARY'S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 242, 250 (2014); John G. Browning, The Digital
Detractor,77 TEX. B.J. 610, 613 (2014).
81. See, e.g., In re Betsy Tsamis, Joint Stipulation and Recommendation for a Reprimand Before
the Hearing Board of the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, Commission No.
10 (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.iardc.org/HBRBDispHtml.asp?id=11221 (a
2013PR00095 at
Chicago lawyer was accused of disclosing confidential information about a client in response to a
negative Avvo review and was reprimanded for his action); N.Y. Bar Ass'n Ethics Op. 1032 (Oct. 30,
2014), https://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=52969) ("A lawyer may not disclose
confidential client information solely to respond to a former client's criticism of the lawyer posted on a
website that includes client reviews of lawyers."); Cal. Bar Ass'n Advisory Op. 2014-1 (Jan. 2014),
https://www.sfbar.org/ethics/opinion_2014-1 .aspx ("An attorney is not ethically barred from responding
generally to an online review by a former client where the former client's matter has concluded ... [but]
Attorney's ongoing] duty of confidentiality [prohibits Attorney] from disclosing [any]
confidential information about the prior representation absent the former client's informed consent or [a]
waiver of confidentiality."); but see LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.6(b)(5) r. 1.6(b)(5) (permitting a
lawyer to disclose confidential information in self-defense, though such a disclosure must not only be
"reasonably... necessary," but also attendant to an ongoing or imminent formal "proceeding").
82. Full Service Advertising, YELP!, https://biz.yelp.com/support/fullservice-advertising (last
visited Feb. 29, 2016).
83. It is beyond the scope of this article to delve into the veracity of the accusations of the
extortionist advertising practices, but anti-Yelp! sentiment is rampant on social media; see, e.g.,
YELPLAWSUIT.COM: REAL CLASS ACTION SUIT BY REAL PEOPLE, YelpLawsuit.com (last visited Feb.
29.2016).
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realities of the relationship between consumer review sites, reviewers,
and the businesses being reviewed demonstrate real inequities that must
be considered in formulating a solution to ensure the goals of the
consumer review site are met-honest and accurate feedback, not
legalized defamation.

II. BRAWLING

WITH THE BULLY

Consumer review site bullies are well insulated on many levels,
ultimately leaving the reviewed businesses with futile litigation options
and the inability to proactively preclude false or misleading reviews.
Suing a user review website based on the accuracy of the content on the
site is pointless as the CDA provides a safe harbor for consumer review
sites from allegations of extortion, defamation, or failure to remove any
reviews. 84 This, of course, leaves the consumer review sites with no
motivation to change their internal policies to ensure the accuracy of the
information posted on their sites. While businesses are not generally
interested in suing individual reviewers, since the website host likely has
deeper pockets, the reviewer is left as the sole target. This avenue is
often pointless, as individual reviewers are shielded from most claims
because they can act anonymously and unmasking a reviewer's identity
is fraught with procedural and constitutional challenges. 85 Furthermore,
attempts to quell individual reviewer comments can result in the
business being subject to state anti-SLAPP laws.86 Frustrated by the
84. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see, e.g., Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roomates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil
Rights Under Law, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (circuit courts have interpreted the CDA to
broadly immunize almost all interactive website operators from defamation actions stemming from
third-party content).
85. Suing an online reviewer for defamation is an often unproductive claim for several other
reasons as well, but the issue of reviewer anonymity is the focus of this article. Exemplifying other
complexities of a defamation claim against an online review, see Seaton v. TripAdvisor, 728 F.3d 592
(6th Cir. 2013). The plaintiff-hotel brought suit against TripAdvisor for defamation and false-light
invasion of privacy for defendant's inclusion of plaintiff's hotel on a top ten list titled "2011 Dirtiest
Hotels." Id. at 594-95. The court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for defamation because
the placement on the list was protected opinion due to the list "employ[ing] loose, hyperbolic language
and its general tenor undermin[ing] any assertion by [the plaintiff] that the list communicates anything
more than the opinions of TripAdvisor's users," and also held that Seaton failed on the false light cause
of action because "he did not allege that he was personally named on the list." Id. at 596. Finally, the
court opined that 'top ten' lists and the like appear with growing frequency on the web," and it is
unreasonable that people reading these lists would expect them to be scientific fact because
TripAdvisor's "method of compiling its user reviews and surveys ... is 'inherently subjective."' Id. at
600-01.
86. Robyn Hagan Cain, Internet Commenter Beats Defamation Suit with Anti-SLAPP Motion,
F1NDLAW (Oct. 8, 2012, 3:02PM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/califomia case law/2012/10/intemetcommenter-beats-defamation-suit-with-anti-slapp-motion.html.
See also supra notes 19-20 and
accompanying text.
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predicament of the seemingly unfair position they are in, some
businesses have attempted to proactively preclude such issues from
arising by contracting with their customers to prohibit the customer from
disseminating negative reviews, but this option too is slowly being
dismantled by state and proposed federal legislation.
A. Futile Responsive Litigation Tactics
Small businesses face a treacherous legal landscape when
contemplating legal action in the face of false or misleading reviews
posted on consumer review sites. Currently, the CDA insulates the
consumer review sites from liability for nearly any content on their sites.
Additionally, unmasking statutes make identifying anonymous
reviewers for purposes of defamation claims almost impossible. Lastly,
the prospect of being on the hook for attorney fees and costs via state
anti-SLAPP laws make the prospect of any litigation at all particularly
risky.
1. The Communications Decency Act of 1996: Safe Harbor to the Bully
While the internal operating policies of most consumer review sites
provide ample opportunity for abuse, consumer review sites have little
motivation to incorporate policies to prevent these abuses because they
are insulated from publisher liability by the CDA.87 The CDA provides
that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider." 88 The protected intermediaries
include not only Internet Service Providers (ISPs), but also "interactive
computer service providers," 89 including online services that publish
third-party content, like a consumer review site host.90 Thus, third-party
87. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1998). See also Paul Ehrlich, The Communications Decency Act, 17
BERKLEY TECH. LAW J. 401,409-10 (2002).

88. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (1998).
89. Id. § 230(f)(2) ('" [I]nteractive computer service' means any information service, system, or
access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems
operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions" and "[t]he term 'information content
provider' means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service").
90. Id. § 230(f)(3). But see 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) for exceptions for certain criminal and
intellectual property:
(1) No effect on criminal law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 or231 of this title,
chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of Title 18, or any
other Federal criminal statute.
(2) No effect on intellectual property law
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content providers may be held liable for claims arising from statements
they publish, but liability is not imputed to interactive computer
services' hosts, acting merely as intermediaries, facilitating the
publication of such content.9 1 Therefore, consumer review sites that
accept user-generated content are not liable for defamation claims or
claims of extortion for failure to remove any reviews stemming from
that content, provided these reviews are submitted by a third-party
user.92 Even amidst allegations of content creation and manipulation,
courts appear unwilling to find consumer review site's liable. 93 The
result of such immunity is that it would be highly impractical for online
intermediaries to prevent objectionable content from appearing on their
sites, and the potential liability for their users' actions would
disincentivize sites from hosting any user
content at all or compel them
94
to continuously censor the site content.
For example, in Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., the plaintiff was an
author with books for sale on the defendant's website, which also
allowed for visitors to the website to post books reviews. 95 Plaintiff
sued Amazon.com for defamation and tortious interference with
business expectancy for negative comments posted by a third-party
96
reviewer on the site in violation of Amazon's posting guidelines.
While Amazon's terms of service provide that Amazon reserves the
right to edit or remove postings, it ultimately did not remove the
offending postings. 97 The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's decision that the Amazon was immune from suit under the
CDA. 98 The court noted that the posting originated from a third-party
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.
91. See, e.g., Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (website host was immunized from liability for comments posted by its users
when it provided open fields for their "additional comments" but lost Section 230 immunity when it
provided "drop-down" menus with answers for users' responses); Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of
N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1020 (N.Y. 2011) (section 230 immunity immunized a company from
defamation claim where employees blogged a comment that included allegations that a competitor was
racist and anti-Semitic as a stand-alone blog post and added a headline and photo of Jesus Christ with
the competitor's face superimposed on the image and wrote a caption describing him as "King of the
Token Jews"); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2009)
(distinguishing Roommates, where the structure and design of the website did not sufficiently contribute
to the illegal content)
92. Levitt v. Yelp Inc., No. C 10-1321 MHP, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99372, at **29-31 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 22, 2011) (discussing Yelp!'s potential liability for deliberate manipulation of customer
reviews); see also Hare v. Richie, No. ELH-11-3488, 2012 WL 3773166, at **18-19 (D. Md. Aug. 29,
2012) (discussing potential liability of the website for derogatory remarks made by a third party).
93. See Levitt, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99372, at **20-21.
94. Id.See Hare, 2012 WL 3773166, at **17, 19.
95. Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 38 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
96. Id. at 39.
97. Id. at 38.
98. Id. at 43.
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reviewer, notwithstanding Amazon's right to edit or remove the
postings. 99 Amazon accordingly was immunized because the
accusations were based on Amazon's alleged failure to timely remove
the offending postings from its site, a liability for which the CDA
provides immunity. 100 It held that "assuming Schneider could prove
existence of an enforceable promise to remove the comments,
Schneider's claim is based entirely on the purported breach-failure to
remove the posting-which is an exercise
of editorial discretion. This is
01
the activity the statute seeks to protect."'
Similarly, in Reit v Yelp!, Inc., the plaintiff, a dentist, alleged that his
practice was defamed by an anonymous poster on Yelp!.1 ° 2 The New
York Supreme Court dismissed the dentist's claims on the grounds that
Yelp! was immune from liability for the defamation claim because of its
status as an interactive computer service. 10 3 Plaintiff also claimed that
Yelp! used deceptive acts and practices because of Yelp!'s "procedure
of removing positive reviews and highlighting negative ones" being
"used as leverage to coerce businesses and professionals into paying for
advertising."' 0 4 The court held that Yelp! 's decision to remove positive
reviews and maintain only the negative review under dentist's listing
was an exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions. 10 5 The
court held that "Yelp[!]'s statement [was] not materially misleading to a
reasonable consumer seeking dentistry, and [was] not a deceptive
practice[,]" because the "allegation that Yelp[!] deletes postings for the
purpose of selling advertising,
if true, is business conduct, not
10 6
consumer-oriented conduct."'
The CDA was not intended "to create a lawless no-man's-land on the
Internet."' 1 7 Instead, the CDA was introduced to incentivize service
providers to delete or otherwise monitor content, particularly "obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, exceedingly violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable," without them becoming publishers, and thus subject to
liability.0 8 The law was written to permit, but n'ot require, site hosts to
99. Id. at 42-43.
100. Schneider, 31 P.3d at43.
101. Id. at41.
102. 907 N.Y.S.2d 411, 412 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010)
103. Id. at415.
104. Id. at 413.

105. Id. at 413-14.
106. Id. at 415.
107. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roomates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
108. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2015). See also 47 U.S.C. § 230(b):
Policy. It is the policy of the United States(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and
other interactive media;
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remove certain content, 10 9 and some consumer review sites have used

this as justification for not removing content from their websites. I x°
While many of the provisions regulating content on the Internet for
"decency" have been struck from the Act as violations of the First
Amendment, the grant of immunity to ISPs and other interactive

computer services for content originating with third-parties has

survived.11 1 As a result, the CDA has been interpreted broadly to
from defamation
"immunize almost all interactive website 1 operators
12

actions stemming from third-party content."

Attempts to sidestep the CDA have been mostly unsuccessful.
Businesses have in some cases attempted to avert false or misleading
negative reviews through copyright assignments so businesses can go

directly to the ISP with copyright infringement claims to issue copyright
violation takedown notices, a simpler process compared to other

litigation. 113 For example, Medical Justice, an online reputation
protection firm touting a "pioneering combination of medico-legal
expertise, resources, and medical reputation management services[,]"
produced for sale a form contract to assign all intellectual property

rights in patient reviews to the physician, in consideration for
confidentiality of patient medical information. 114 The Center for
Democracy & Technology filed a complaint with the Federal Trade

Commission regarding Medical Justice's sale of the form contract,
alleging deceptive and unfair business practices and Medical Justice
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information is
received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer
services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies
that empower parents to.restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material;
( 1
and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity,
stalking, and harassment by means of computer.
109. Ehrlich, supra note 87, at 407-08; see also Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331
(4th Cir. 1997) (holding that Congress intended § 230's broad immunity to intemet providers because
when "[f]aced with potential liability for each message republished by their services, interactive
computer service providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages posted.").
110. See ArbitrationProgram, supra note 57 (policy to consider removal of certain content from
its website only when presented with a court order declaring information in a Report defamatory).
111. Ehrlich, supra note 87, at 408. See also Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844,
849 (1996) (holding portions of the CDA unconstitutional for its overbroad limitations on protected
speech).
112. See Andrew Bluebond, Note, When the Customer is Wrong: Defamation, Interactive
Websites, and Immunity, 33 REV. LITIG. 679, 684 (2014) (debate regarding whether the CDA is suitable
for the Internet in 2014 and beyond).
113. Lee, supra note 77, at 593 n.139.
114. See "What We Do", MEDICALJUSTICE.COM, http://www.medicaljustice.com/services/whatwe-do/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2016). See also Lee, supra note 77, at 605.
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stopped selling these forms in 2012.115
With no requirement to remove content and no legal repercussions for
the accuracy of the content, a consumer review site can shelter in the
safe harbors of the CDA and businesses are thwarted from brawling
with the consumer review site bullies.
2. Unmasking the Identity of Anonymous Reviewers
In theory, individual reviewers are liable for defamation for false or
misleading reviews posted online. However, in practice, reviewers are
mostly shielded from the legal repercussions from such postings. While
the CDA immunizes consumer review sites from claims based on the
content posted by third parties on their sites, reviewers themselves are
liable for the accuracy of the content. To be sure, while the First
Amendment ensures free speech, it does not protect false or untruthful
comments that defame a company's reputation.1 1 6 Defamatory and
libelous speech "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality."'1 17 Thus, in deciding whether a company can sue
individual reviewers for their negative comments online, it comes down
to the ability of the reviewed business to prove that the statements made
were untrue. That is, claims for defamation are unwarranted unless the
statements are factually false because the First Amendment prevents
opinions from serving as the basis of defamation actions.1 18 However,
where the online reviewer is anonymous, proving that an online review
is false is problematic because the reviewed business does not know
what the consumer's experience actually was until the identity of the
consumer is revealed.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a speaker's
decision to remain anonymous is "an aspect of the freedom of speech
protected by the First Amendment" 119 and online speech has as much

115. Id. Lee, supra note 77, at 599.
116. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171 (1979) ("Spreading false information in and of itself
carries no First Amendment credentials.").
117. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
118. Milovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1990) (addressing the constitutional
limits of fact versus opinion); see also Brompton Bldg., LLC v. Yelp!, Inc., No. 1-12-0547, 2013 WL
416185, at **2, 10 (Ill. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2013) (applying the fact versus option doctrine in consumer
case; broadly construing "opinion" to include reviewer's specific online allegations that plaintiff lied
about the date it received her rent check and that plaintiff "is illegally charging tenants late fees for their
rent").
119. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (anonymity is generally
protected under the first amendment, though commercial speech is subject to lesser protections).
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First Amendment protection as offline speech. 120 Accordingly, in many
states, identifying an anonymous user's identity is challenging because a
business seeking documentation via subpoena to the user review website
must essentially prove a case against an anonymous reviewer on the
12 1 The
merits before forcing the disclosure of the reviewer's identity.
test used to balance a person's right to anonymously speak on the
Internet against the right to protect one's identity is the Dendrite-Cahill
test. 22 This requires a plaintiff who seeks to unmask anonymous users
to: (1) provide sufficient notice to the anonymous posters that they are
the subject of an application to disclose their identity; (2) identify the
exact statements, which purportedly constitute actionable speech; and
(3) provide the court with sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case. 123 Thereafter, the court must balance the defendant's First
Amendment right against the strength of the prima facie case
presented. 124 Therefore, a plaintiff must often have substantial evidence
1
before bringing a lawsuit. 125
6 a
12
For example, in Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie,
Maryland appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion by
compelling the identification of an online reviewer because the reviewed
business failed to prove a valid defamation claim. 127 The court devoted
much of the opinion to reviewing the history of anonymity on the
Internet, focusing on the fact that anonymity has historically been part of
Internet culture 128 and has "played an important role in the progress of
mankind. 1 29 Applying the Dendrite rule, the court recognized that
130
protection of anonymous speech is not absolute when defamatory, but
"dirty and
held the following remarks were protected speech:
120. See Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997).
121. See e.g., Dendrite Intern., Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001) (rejecting an attempt to compel Yahoo to disclose the identity of the person who posted negative
comments on an online bulletin board about a business because evidence of damage, an element of a
claim for defamation, was not shown); see also Erik P. Lewis, Note, Unmasking "Anon12345":
Applying An Appropriate Standard When Private Citizens Seek The Identity Of Anonymous Internet
Defamation Defendants, U. ILL. L. REv. 947, 955 (2009).
122. John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460 (Del. 2005); see also Dendrite Intern., Inc., 775
A.2d at 770.
123. John Doe No. 1,884 A.2d at 460.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 461; Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 244-45 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). The
plaintiff, president of a publicly traded "global development drug service company," sued ten "Doe"
defendants for anonymous defamatory remarks made on internet message boards and served a subpoena
on the custodian of records at Yahoo! The court found that the online postings did not constitute
"assertions of actual fact and therefore were not actionable."
126. Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 419 (Md. 2009).
127. Id. at440.
128. Id. at 438-39.
129. Id. at 440.
130. Id. at 441-42.
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unsanitary-looking food-service plates . . . allowing trash from those
establishments to 'waft' into the nearby waterway,"' 13 1 and claims
accusing the plaintiff of committing arson.' 32 The Court explained that
the plaintiff was not able to establish a sufficient claim for defamation
against any of the online reviewers to justify revealing their actual
identities. 133
Highlighting the further difficulty of enforcing a subpoena, the
Virginia Supreme Court recently vacated a state appellate order
requiring Yelp! to comply with a subpoena to reveal the identities of
certain reviewers a local business claimed had posted false negative
reviews. 134 In Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., Hadeed filed
a defamation action against three anonymous defendants, alleging they
falsely represented themselves as customers and posted false negative
reviews regarding Hadeed's business on Yelp!. 35 Each of the reviews
in question made similar disparaging claims, including price gouging,
charging double the estimate, or damaging and shrinking rugs. One of
the reviews came from an individual claiming to be in New Jersey, a
state in which Hadeed does not operate. 136 Hadeed compared the
reviewers' claims with customer records and found that none matched,
demonstrating that the reviewers were not actual customers. Hadeed
issued a subpoena to Yelp!, seeking the author's identifying
information. 137
After complying with Virginia's procedural
requirements for a subpoena seeking to unmask the anonymous speaker,
the trial court held that Yelp! must comply with the subpoena to reveal
the reviewers identities. 138 The trial court issued an order enforcing the
subpoena and eventually held Yelp! in civil contempt when it refused to
comply. 139 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision 140 and
the Virginia Supreme Court ultimately reversed and vacated the order,
finding "the circuit court was not empowered to enforce the subpoena

131. Indep. Newspapers, 966 A.2d at 442.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 430.
134. Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 770 S.E.2d 440, 441 (Va. 2015).
135. Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 752 S.E.2d 554, 558 (Va. Ct. App. 2014),
vacated, 770 S.E.2d 440, 441 (Va. 2015).
136. Id. at567.
137. Id. at 558.
138. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1(A) (a person seeking a subpoena to unmask the anonymous
Internet speaker must demonstrate: speech that actually is or may be tortious or illegal; other efforts to
identify the speaker have proved fruitless; identity of the speaker is needed; no case-ending (summary
judgment, demurrer, etc.) motion is pending; the individual subpoenaed have or are likely to have the
information. There is also a notice to the speaker provision, which allows the speaker to contest the
unmasking").
139. HadeedCarpet Cleaning,752 S.E.2d at 557.
140. Id.
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duces tecum against Yelp." 141 The court explained
the circuit court was not empowered to enforce the nonparty subpoena duces tecum directing Yelp to produce
documents located in California in connection with
Hadeed's underlying defamation action against the John
Doe defendants in the Virginia circuit court [because]
[t]he information sought by Hadeed is stored by Yelp in
the usual course of its business on administrative
databases within the custody or control of only specified
Yelp employees located in San Francisco, and thus,
142
beyond the reach of the circuit court.
The practical application of these constitutional safeguards for
anonymous speech in defamation claims in the context of review posted
on consumer review sites, coupled with the CDA's immunity of the
consumer review site, is that legal recourse against an individual
reviewer or the consumer review site itself is inconsequential.
3. Anti-SLAPP Laws
Even if a business is able to state a claim against an online reviewer
or consumer review site, anti-SLAPP laws make litigation particularly
risky. 143 Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) are
lawsuits brought against people who speak out on issues of public
interest. 144 Most states have anti-SLAPP laws to protect people from
harassment or intimidation from speaking out on matters of public
concern. 14 5 The laws are grounded in the constitutional right of free
141. Id.
142. Hadeed CarpetCleaning, 770 S.E.2d at 445.
143. Robert D. Richards, A SLAPP In the Facebook: Assessing the Impact of Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Partici'ationon Social Networks, Blogs and Consumer Gripe Sites, 21 DEPAUL J. ART,
TECH. & IP LAW 221, 223 (2011).
144. Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 940 (Mass. 1998) (anti-SLAPP
cases are "generally meritless suits brought by large private interests to deter common citizens from
exercising their political or legal rights or to punish them for doing so").
145. While no current federal anti-SLAPP legislation exists, a federal anti-SLAPP bill was
introduced in Congress in May, The Speak Free Act, 2015 H.R. 2304, 114th Cong. (2015). State
statutes exist in: Arizona (ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 12-751-752 (2006)); Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 1663-501--508 (2005)); Delaware (10 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 8136-8138 (1992)); District of Columbia (D.C.
CODE 16-5502 (2011)); Florida (FLA. STAT. §§ 720.304, 768.295 (2000)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. §
9-11-11.1 (1996)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 634F-4 (2002)); Illinois (735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1110/99 (2007)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 34-7-7-1-10 (1998)); Louisiana (LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN.
art. 971 (1999)); Maine (14 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 556 (1995)); Maryland (MD. CTS. & JIJD. PROC.
CODE ANN § 5-807 (2004)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (1994)); Minnesota
(MINN. STAT. §§ 554.01-05 (1994)); Missouri (Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.528 (2004)); Nebraska (NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 25-21,241-246 (1994)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.635-670 (1993)); New Mexico
(N.M. STAT. §§ 38-2-9.1-9.2 (2001)); New York (N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 70-a, 76-a (2008); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 3211); Oklahoma (12 OKLA. STAT. § 1443.1 (1994)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. §§ 31.150.152 (2001)); Pennsylvania (27 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7707, 8301-8303 (2000)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN.
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speech and petition and the harm to public interest if critics are silenced
from sharing their experiences in a public forum. 146 Anti-SLAPP laws
are not intended to protect false criticism or speech intended solely to
harm competitors; yet, reviewers and consumer review sites shelter here
as well.
To protect public participation, anti-SLAPP laws give defendants the
option to file a special motion to dismiss a SLAPP claim and recover
costs and attorneys' fees. 147 To succeed on an anti-SLAPP motion, a
defendant must generally show that (1) the statement in question was
made in a public forum and concerned an issue of public interest and (2)
148
the plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits of the claim.
"Online reviews, courts generally hold, are statements made in a public
149
forum and do sometimes concern an issue of public interest.' '
However, requiring a plaintiff to provide proof demonstrating the
likelihood of success on their defamation claim is a difficult task early in
litigation, especially if the review's author is anonymous.
For example, in Davis v. Avvo, Inc., the plaintiff, a board certified
attorney in health law, brought suit for false advertising,
misrepresentation, and use of his photograph, against Avvo, Inc., a
website operator that provides professional profiles and rankings to the
public. 150 Among other allegations, Davis claimed, that Avvo listed him
as an employment lawyer when in fact he was a board-certified health
law practitioner. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant "coerced
lawyers by illegal and tortious conduct, on an epidemic scale, to correct
mislistings" by intentionally misstating lawyers' practice areas as a way
to force lawyers to "claim" their profile (to correct it) and then Avvo
induces them to buy a premium membership to prevent competitors' ads
from appearing on their profile pages. 151 Davis also alleged that a
potential client who had used Avvo contacted him upon concluding that
LAWS §§ 9-33-1-4 (1995)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-1001-1004 (1997)); Texas (Tx.
Crv. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 27.001-.011 (2011)), Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-6-1401-1405
(2001)); Vermont (12 V.S.A. § 1041 (2005)); and Washington (WASH. REV. CODE (ARCW) §§
4.24.500-.525 (2010)). Judicially adopted protections against SLAPPs exist in: Colorado, see Protect
Our Mountain Env't, Inc. v. District Court of Cty. of Jefferson, 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984), and West
Virginia, Harris v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549 (W. Va. 1993). The following states do not have antiSLAPP laws: Wyoming, Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi,
Montana, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
146. Richards, supra note 143, at 222.
147. Id. at 243.
148. See, e.g., Wong v. Jing, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 747, 759 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (citing CAL. CODE
CIV. PRO. § 425.16 (2009)).
149. See Bently Reserve LP v.Papaliolios, 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 423 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); see also
Wong, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 759.
150. No. C11-1571RSM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43743, at **1-3, 7 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 28, 2012).
151. Id. at *14.
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because he was the "lowest rated employment lawyer" he must be
"desperate for employment."1' 52 Avvo subsequently filed and met its
burden for-an anti-SLAPP motion, 153 finding reasoning that the Avvo
website is "an action involving public participation" that qualifies for
anti-SLAPP protection under Washington State law. The U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington found that the profile
pages on Avvo's website constituted a vehicle for discussion of public
issues, pointing out that the website provides potentially helpful
information to the public and that the public could participate in the
forum by providing reviews of lawyers. Protected by the anti-SLAPP
law, the burden then shifted to Davis to show, by clear and convincing
evidence, a probability of prevailing on his claims. The court concluded
that Davis did not meet that burden and held that the plaintiff provided
no evidence in his complaint "to demonstrate that there is any
probability of prevailing" on his claim because he only presented
firsthand knowledge of the allegations and did not explain "how [the]
allegedly deceptive act of Avvo induced him to act or refrain from
acting in some manner" or allege actual damages. 154 The court granted
defendant's motion to strike and held that Avvo, protected by
to attorneys' fees and costs,
Washington's anti-SLAPP law, was entitled
1 55
as well as a $10,000 statutory penalty.
While the procedures and protections of anti-SLAPP laws vary, they
are all meant to "protect[] citizens from David and Goliath power
difference" that exist between SLAPP parties. 156 The reality of the
relationship between consumer review sites, individual reviewers, and
businesses is that small businesses have no recourse against individual
reviewers or consumer reviews sites. Consequently, the admirable
policies behind anti-SLAPP laws are often not upheld.
B. FutileProactivePreclusion Tactics

Against the backdrop of the CDA, unmasking statutes, and antiSLAPP laws, legal recourse to rebuff false or misleading reviews posted
on consumer review sites is often futile. Because the internal policies of
consumer review sites are equally unproductive, some businesses have
attempted to proactively preclude such issues from arising by
contracting directly with their customers to prohibit the customer from
disseminating negative reviews. Little litigation has been amassed on
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Id. at *8.
Id.at **20-22.
Id. at *25..
See Stubom Ltd. P'ship v. Bernstein, 245 F. Supp. 2d 312, 314 (D. Mass. 2003).
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the enforceability of such non-disparagement clauses in consumer
contracts, but California's A.B. 2365 and the proposed Consumer
Review Freedom Act of 2014 (CRFA) contribute to the seemingly
insurmountable laws stacked against small businesses in attempting to

brawl with the bullies.
1. California A.B. 2365
The rhetoric surrounding Palmer v. KlearGear-addressing the need

to protect customers from unwittingly being silenced from posting
honest reviews about shoddy products and service-was the impetus for

California Assembly Member John A. Perez to introduce California

A.B. 2365 in February 2014.157 With its passage, California became the

first state to codify legislation specifically targeting non-disparagement

clauses in consumer contracts. Dubbed the "Yelp! Bill," the new law

effectively prohibits all non-disparagement provisions in consumer sales
and service agreements as against public policy.1 58 Unaware, perhaps,

of the CDA, the challenges in navigating unmasking statutes, and antiSLAPP laws, Perez queried:
[s]uch clauses also arguably raise a question as to why
defamation actions are not sufficient to address harms

where the statements are false and harm the other party's
business reputation as that recourse would not impose a
gag order on customers for honest reviews based not

only on their perception of their experience,
but also
159
based potentially on the objective facts.
Supporting the ban on non-disparagement

clauses,

the Bill's

introduction further provides that "[e]xisting law generally regulates
formation and enforcement of contracts, including what constitutes an
unlawful contract.

Under existing law a contract is unlawful if it is

157. Assembly Floor Analysisfor Assembly Bill 2365 from May 9, 2014, 2013-14 Regular Sess. 3,
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill-id=201320140AB2365
("Although
this particular example happened to not originate in California, in the age of Internet commerce it just as
easily could have, since the physical location of online businesses is largely irrelevant because online
consumers can typically purchase goods regardless of where they live. Indeed, an Internet search shows
that non-disparagement clauses have recently emerged in consumer contracts in several contexts,
including at least one involving a California company.").
158. California A.B. 2365 was codified as CAL CIV. CODE § 1670.8(a)(1) (2015) ("A contract or
proposed contract for the sale or lease of consumer goods or services may not include a provision
waiving the consumer's right to make any statement regarding the seller or lessor or its employees or
agents, or concerning the goods or services." It is also "unlawful to threaten or to seek to enforce such
non-disparagement clause, or to otherwise penalize a consumer for making any statement protected
under this section, and subjects any person violating this provision to a $2,500 civil penalty for the first
violation, and $5,000 for each violation thereafter.").
159. Sen. Judiciary Comm. Analysis for Assembly Bill 2365 from June 23, 2014, 2013-14 Reg.
Sess. 5, http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?billid=201320140AB2365.
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contrary to an express provision of law, contrary to the policy of express
not expressly prohibited, or otherwise contrary to good
law, though
160
morals."'
Indeed, the stated public policy underlying the proposed legislation
was admirable: it aimed to protect customers from unscrupulous
businesses seeking to hide shoddy products and substandard service
behind non-disparagement clauses hidden deep within the boilerplate of
the terms and services. The Senate Judiciary Committee described the
Bill as one that would outlaw a contract for the sale of consumer goods
or services if it "includes a provision requiring the consumer to waive
his or her right to make any statement regarding the consumer's
experience . . . unless the waiver of this right was knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent." 161 Perez, explaining the stated need for the Bill, wrote:
Consumers should not be financially penalized for
providing honest online statements relative to their on
line retail transaction experience. Honest feedback i[s]
crucial to assure consumer confidence in the on line
retail environment. Therefore consumers should not
unknowingly or unwillingly give up this right to speak
freely about their online retail experience. Such nondisparagement clauses go beyond an embargo on
business-oriented "trade secrets," but instead represent
an unreasonable limitation on individual freedom. AB
2365 helps to ensure this free flow of communication. 162
Based on this, California A.B. 2365 was passed with near universal
of voiced opposition is found in the Assembly
approval, and no record
1 63
or Senate Committees.
Despite its admirable stated purpose, the actual language and reach of
the legislation is much broader than the narrow set of circumstances for
which it was intended. While the legislative history and proposed
language of the Bill reflected concern with a scenario like Palmer's, in
which a non-disparagement clause was secretly inserted into a consumer
contract, the proposed language allowing for a "knowing, voluntary and
intelligent" waiver was stricken leaving the codified law voiding any
non-disparagement clause in a consumer contract. 1 64 Thus, the text of
160. California A.B. 2365, codified at CAL CIv. CODE § 1670.8(a)(1) (2015),
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill-id=201320140AB2365.
161. Sen. Judiciary Comm. Analysis for Assembly Bill 2365 from June 23, 2014, 2013-14 Reg.
Sess. 5, http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?billid=201320140AB2365.
162. Id.
163. Assembly Floor Vote for Assembly Bill 2365 from May 15, 2014, 2013-14 Reg. Sess. 5,
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml?bill-id=201320140AB2365.
164. CAL. CfV. CODE § 1670.8(a) (2015) provides that "A contract or proposed contract for the
sale or lease of consumer goods or services may not include a provision waiving the consumer's right to
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the codified law-California Civil Code Section 1680.8(a)-is not
consistent with its own underlying public policy.
Accordingly, in California, a consumer cannot contract with a
business-even in a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent manner-to
waive their right to disparage a business.
It shields not only
unscrupulous businesses seeking to protect shoddy products and
substandard service from review, but also legitimate businesses trying to
protect themselves against unscrupulous customers or competitors who
may anonymously, unfairly, or falsely disparage the business product or
services. This effectively opens the floodgates for dodgy customers
hoping to make the most of a small grievance against a business--or
perhaps no grievance at all-to threaten posting a bad review in return
for discounted or free products or services.
California remains the only state to pass legislation directly on point,
but it has reinforced the growing sentiment against non-disparagement
clauses in consumer contracts. Other states and the federal government
are currently considering similar legislation.
2. The Consumer Review Freedom Act of 2014
The Consumer Review Freedom Act of 2014 (CRFA) was introduced
into the United States House of Representatives in September of 2014
based on suggestions that "Congress should pass legislation that would
void anti-disparagement clauses in consumer contracts that restrict
consumers from making public comments on businesses . . . [and]
authorize the Federal Trade Commission to take action165 against
businesses [who insert such clauses into consumer contracts].
Supporting the CFRA, Representative Eric Swalwell noted "[i]t's unAmerican that any consumer would be penalized for writing an honest
review."'1 66 Mostly paralleling California's law, the CRFA bars certain
contract provisions that prohibit consumers from commenting publicly
about businesses. The CRFA provides:
a provision of a form contract is void from the inception
of such contract if [it]: (1) prohibits or restricts the
ability of a person who is a party to the form contract to
engage in [written, verbal, or pictorial reviews, or other
similar performance assessments or analyses of, the
products, services, or conduct of a business that is a

make any statement regarding the seller or lessor or its employees or agents, or concerning the goods or
services."
165. Castro & Drees, supra note 71, at 10.
166. Laura Ryan, Congress's Right for Your Right to Yelp, NAT'L J. (Sept. 17, 2014),
https://swalwell.house.gov/media-center/in-the-news/congresss-fight-your-right-yelp.
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party to the contract]; (2) imposes a penalty or fee
against [such a person] for engaging in [such
communications]; or (3) assigns or provides an exclusive
license, or requires [such a person] to assign or provide
an exclusive license, to any of the person's intellectual
property rights that such party has or may have [in such
communications].167
Unlike California's legislation, the proposed federal legislation does
not specify statutory penalties or create a private cause of action for use
of non-disparagement clauses, but rather provides for enforcement by
the Federal Trade Commission and state attorneys general. 168 Notably,
in the legislation's definitions sections, the Bill defines "form contract"
as "a standardized contract used by a business and imposed on a party
without a meaningful opportunity for said party to negotiate the
standardized terms." 169 This language implies that if a party were
provided a meaningful opportunity to negotiate the standardized terms,
the law would not prohibit the parties from including a nondisparagement clause as part of a consumer contract. Yet, the actual
language of the law remains unknown and-if following in California's
precedent-the legislature could still back-step on this too.

III. A PROPOSAL TO ENFORCE NON-DISPARAGEMENT

CLAUSES IN

CONSUMER CONTRACTS

Therefore, you have this paramountpublic policy to consider-that
170
you are not lightly to interfere with thisfreedom of contract.
The extension of rules declaring that a given contract clause void as a
matter of public policy requires scrutiny of those underlying public
policies themselves. The recently enacted state, and proposed federal,
legislation voiding non-disparagement clauses in consumer contracts fail
to consider scenarios where such clause may be a justifiable business
practice. In particular, California Civil Code Section 1680.8(a)-the
text of which extends far beyond the original underlying policyexemplifies the need to closely examine the underlying public policies
as the other states and the federal government consider this same
167. H.R. 5499, 113th Cong. § 2(a) (2014). But see id. § 2(c) (the law sets forth a few exceptions
for the prohibition: a provision shall not be considered void under this Act if the provision prohibits
disclosure of certain: (1) trade secrets or commercial or financial information, (2) personnel and medical
files, or (3) law enforcement records).
168. Id. § 2(e)-(f).
169. Id. § 2(g)(3).
170. Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, [1875] EWCA (Civ) 19 L.R.-. Eq. at 465
(Eng.).
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concern.
Stemming from Palmerv. KlearGearis the mistaken rhetoric that any

business seeking to incorporate a non-disparagement clause into a
consumer contract is solely trying to silence online feedback while it
sells shoddy products and service. That court did not scrutinize the nondisparagement clause under traditional contract law theories; yet, the

default judgement in that case inspired the "public policy" upon which
the California legislation and the proposed federal legislation was based,
declaring non-disparagement clauses in consumer contracts to be
unenforceable. 171 While little case law has been amassed on the
enforceability of such clauses in this context, the issue is ripe for
analysis and courts must acknowledge that scenarios exist in which a
non-disparagement clause in a consumer contract is a justifiable
business practice. These clauses can properly be analyzed under
traditional contract law to give effect to those agreements entered into in

a knowing, voluntary and intelligent manner.
The public policy contract defense has played a crucial role in a wide
range of contract cases and can be based on constitutions, statues, local

ordinances, administrative regulations, case precedent, and a judge's
personal view of "what public interest or morality requires to overrule
market choices."' 72 This doctrine has been applied to various scenarios
such as illegal contracts and those that obstruct the administration of
Moreover, this doctrine, although having no precise
justice. 17
definition, 174 allows courts to "subjugate private ordering to a system of
parties,
state regulation, override the expressed preferences of private
175
and substitute their own judgment for that of the market."
Courts often use public policy as a justification to not enforce a
contract. 176 However, this may create the risk that public policy
defenses are used too liberally, making it a rule instead of the
171. See Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing,supranote 159, at 6.
172. G. Richard Shell, Contractsin the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 431, 442 (1993).
See also Benjamin P. Cooper, Taking Rules Seriously: The Rise of Lawyer Rules As Substantive Law
and the Public Policy Exception in Contract Law, 35 CARDozo L. REv. 267, 276 (2013) ("In weighing
a public policy against enforcement of a term, the Restatement directs courts to consider: (a) the
strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or judicial decisions, (b) the likelihood that a refusal
to enforce the term will further that policy, (c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the
extent to which it was deliberate, and (d) the directness of the connection between that misconduct and
the term.").
173. Shell, supranote 172, at 441.
174. See, e.g., Allen v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 37 A.2d 37, 38-39 (N.J. 1944); Brawner v.
Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 812 (Mo. 1959) (explaining that public policy is synonymous with social
welfare or the good of the collective body).
175. Shell, supra note 172, at 438 (this ability to overrule market choices can "add[] a degree of
uncertainty to commercial transactions").
176. See John Bernard Corr, Modern Choice of Law and Public Policy: The Emperor Has the
Same Old Clothes, 39 U. MIAMI L. REv. 647, 660 (1985).
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exception. 177 This power makes it difficult to predict scenarios in which
public policy will be applied by a court,' 78 frustrates the expectations of
the non-breaching party, and could unjustly enrich the breaching
party. 179 Some courts have remedied this by requiring a "substantial"
public policy.1 80 A similar approach has been taken in the limited public
policy exception to the general arbitration deference. 18' For example,
the Restatement (Second) suggests that public policy defenses should
only be used to justify the non-enforcement of a contract when "public
policies against82enforcement 'clearly outweigh' the interests in favor of
enforcement."'
Non-disparagement clauses have long appeared as negotiated terms of
business-to-business contracts, settlement agreements, and employment
contracts, and sound public policies, including the freedom to contract,
have upheld these clauses as justifiable business practices. Indeed, the
policing of contract terms must always be balanced with the right to
contract, guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.1 83 Courts have developed a framework to analyze terms in
consumer contracts, particularly those purporting to waive constitutional
rights. A similar framework could be applied to non-disparagement
clauses in consumer contracts.
A contract must be entered into in a voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent manner1 84 so as not to violate public policy.' 85 Under section
178 of the Restatement of Contracts, a contract term is unenforceable on
public policy grounds "if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or
the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Alan E. Garfield, Promisesof Silence: ContractLaw and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 261, 298-99 (1998).
180. Feliciano v. 7-Eleven Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713, 718 (W. Va. 2001).
181. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987) (establishing a
framework for courts reviewing public policy claims; the court must determine whether there is an
explicit, well defined, and dominant public policy that is "ascertained by reference to the laws and legal
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests, then determine whether the
arbitration award itself is clearly shown to be 'contrary' to the explicit, well-defined, and dominant
public policy"). See also In re Grievance Arbitration Between State Org. of Police Officers, 353 P.3d
998, 1007-09 (Haw. 2015).
182. Garfield, supranote 179, at 299.
183. Freedom of Contract,CCH-TRR 630.40, 2010 WL 204453 (Wolters Kluwer).
184. See Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and
Freedom of Contract:A Comparative Study, 77 HARv. L. REv. 401,409 (1964).
185. Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the "'Riseand Fall," 79 B.U.L. REV.
263, 281 (1999) (in determining whether a contract violates public policy, "[t]he question is: 'Is the
reduction of individual freedom caused by the regulation or decision outweighed by either the need to
protect the health and welfare of members of society or by such considerations as equality, fairness, or
community?').
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by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms." Thus, if
legislation does not specifically address a public policy basis for nonenforcement, the Restatement provides that a court can deny
enforcement to a contract term if, under the circumstances, public policy
outweighs the interests in favor of enforcing the term. These bases for
enforcing contracts clarify the importance of the legislature being
informed of both sides of a public policy before enacting law that will
be used as the basis to void contracts. It also suggests that courts should
be reluctant to deny enforcement on public policy grounds unless
enforcement is clearly outweighed by public policy for nonenforcement.
There is no question that contracts of silence warrant careful judicial
scrutiny. Of concern is when the accuracy of the information forming
the basis of the public policy itself is questionable, because then the
legitimate interest in its dissemination is diminished. That is, legislation
as a basis for non-enforcement based on public policy raises concern
over the accuracy of the legislative analysis itself. For example, where
the honesty of a review found on consumer review sites cannot be
assured, and the potential harm to the reviewed businesses is so grave,
there seems questionable overriding public interest in the speech.
Speech, of course, is permissibly restricted by contract in many
contexts. For example, non-disparagement clauses are common to
employment separation agreements. 186 In this context, employees
typically agree to not "defame, disparage, or criticize the reputation,
practices, or conduct of the company and its employees, directors, and
officers" in order to receive a benefit, such as severance pay, 187 and are
often created to preclude badmouthing by former employees.'1 88 Society
accepts that this is beneficial to a business because it allows loss
prevention when a business must terminate an employee, and decreases
the risk and cost of litigation.1 89 Based on similar sound public policies,
permissible speech restrictions are also found in confidentiality and noncompete covenants. For example, "anticompetitive covenants have been
included in contracts for the sale of a business or practice, in
employment contracts, in partnership agreements, and in lease

186. See, e.g., Joe English, EEOC Takes Aim at Nondisparagement Clauses, 26 No. 7 Ga. Emp.
L. Letter 1 (2014).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Megan M. Belcher, A Clean Break"Best Practices in Negotiating and DraftingSeverance

Agreements, ASS'N OF CORP. COUNSEL DOCKET 36-37 (Mar. 2008) (non-disparagement clauses are
necessary in the modem world where there is ever-increasing "employee mobility," litigation costs, and
a need to protect proprietary information).
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agreements."'1 90 Since the 1960s, physician restrictive covenants have

also steadily gained in use and importance within the medical
community. 191

Substantive standards for non-disparagement clauses could be crafted
to ensure the policies behind the CDA and anti-SLAPP laws are upheld,

so that people with honest criticisms are not silenced by unscrupulous
businesses seeking to shield themselves from reproach. For example,
the law presumes that customers have read and understand the terms of
their product or service agreement; yet, there is no question that courts

should safeguard the sound public policy of ensuring that unscrupulous
businesses do not hide clauses deep in the fine print of a long

contract. 192 As such-acknowledging that consumers have become
accustomed to ignoring the boilerplate text contained online and that

most consumers simply "click through" the terms and conditions to

complete a purchase 193-- current contract law voids any such contracts

of adhesion. 194 Under this existing framework, a non-disparagement
clause not entered into in a knowing, voluntary and intelligent manner
would not be enforced. On the flip side, courts should permit
enforcement of ones where the consumer explicitly acknowledges and
agrees to such terms.

For example, courts routinely enforce contracts between businesses
and sales or service customers where customers relinquish their right to
a trial before their peers. 195 Given the potential for abuse with this
business practice, courts have developed strict standards to ensure that
arbitration clauses are agreed to in a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent

manner by requiring certain formatting characteristics to make the
arbitration provision obvious, often requiring consumers to sign or
initial right next to the arbitration provision itself.196 Contractual

190. Francis M. Doughtery, Anticompetitive covenants: aerial spray dust business, 60 A.L.R.4th
965 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
191. Joey D. Havens & Roy W. Breitenbach, Non-Competes: Enforceable or Not?, AHLAPAPERS P02050716 (2007).
192. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
193. See supra note 163.
194. See, e.g., Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 985 (9th Cir. 2007)
(an agreement may be unconscionable "when the party with substantially greater bargaining power
presents a take-it-or-leave it contract to a customer," or if the terms are overly one-sided or if its terms
have an overly harsh effect); Kilgore v. Key Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 718 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013); Aral v.
EarthLink, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005), abrogatedin partby AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011).
195. See, e.g., Kilgore, 718 F.3d 1052.
196. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration'sSummer Soldiers: An EmpiricalStudy ofArbitration
Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 882-83 (2008)
(finding that over seventy-five percent of consumer contracts contain mandatory arbitration clauses).
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arbitration has become quite common in consumer settings1 97 and due to
the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA), arbitration
agreements are given the same treatment by courts as other contractual

provisions. 198 These arbitration clauses have been increasing enforced
in in consumer related disputes200199 in consumer contracts involving the
"average American consumer.,
Somehow, once a waiver of constitutional rights is
clothed as a binding arbitration clause, the courts

evaluate it like any other contractual provision. Some
courts even give preference to arbitration clauses,

construing them more broadly and holding them valid
more often than if they were dealing with basic contract
terms .... Rather than require that binding arbitration

clauses be entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and
intentionally, the Court has said that arbitrability
questions should be resolved in favor of arbitration,

regardless of the events surrounding the agreement.2 °1
Thus, contractual arbitration agreements are "valid, irrevocable, and
202
enforceable," except upon grounds sufficient to revoke any contract.

"No longer must a court ask if the party knowingly, voluntarily, and
intentionally waived its rights, but rather it must work against a
presumption of arbitrability and ask if the arbitration clause shows
fraud, duress, or unconscionability. '2 °3 Arbitration agreements are also
subject to common law contract defenses.20 4

Court have further

developed procedural safeguards for arbitration including mandatory
clauses, guaranteed access to courts for common law negligence and
damages, party consent, voluntary commitment, and party agreement,
197. Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: a Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 966-67 (2000) (citing to examples in
banking, health care, insurance, cell phone and credit card agreements, and retail purchases).
198. Michelle L. Caton, Comment, Form Over Fairness: How the Supreme Court's Misreading
of the FederalArbitration Act Has Left Consumers in a Lurch, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 497, 498-99
(2014).
199. Reuben, supranote 197, at 963.
200. Id.
201. Marissa Dawn Lawson, Judicial Economy at What Cost? An Argument for Finding Binding
Arbitration Clauses PrimaFacie Unconscionable,23 REV. LITIG. 463, 472-73 (2014).
202. Ann C. Hodges, JudicialReview of Arbitration Awards on Public Policy Grounds: Lessons
from the Case Law, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 91, 100-01 (2000) (there are two different views of
the public policy standard of arbitration agreements: "Under one interpretation, an arbitration award can
be vacated on public policy grounds only if the arbitration award itself violates positive law or requires
the employer to violate positive law. This standard has been denominated the narrow or limitist
exception. The alternative view, the broad public policy exception, does not require a demonstration
that the arbitration award either violates positive law ... but rather looks for a conflict with public
policy more broadly defined") (emphasis in original).
203. Lawson, supranote 201, at 479.
204. Reuben, supranote 197, at 1005.
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and that no party is egregiously favored.2 °5 And although many have
expressed concern for due process in regards to arbitration, the Supreme
Court "has demonstrated an extremely flexible approach 2to6 determining
whether a situation constitutionally satisfies" due process. 0
Procedural and substantive regulation of non-disparagement clauses
in consumer contracts can both ensure that the terms are entered into in
a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent manner. Any claim of trickery can
be avoided by requiring the business to make the non-disparagement
clause conspicuous-through the provision's placement, other
formatting, or both-and requiring the consumer to sign or initial right
next to the clause to ensure that the consumer has read the term. If
concrete standards for non-disparagement agreements in consumer and
sales contracts were both practical to implement and enforce, they
would protect businesses from the stranglehold of online reviews and
protect consumers from being tricked into silencing terms of service to
which they did not agree. The same policies facing arbitration can fairly
be applied to non-disparagement agreements and would permit small
businesses to protect their reputations online, while also ensuring that
customers are not tricked into a contract for bad service and no speech
outlet.
The ideal scenario would be to preserve the integrity of consumer
review sites as a forum for sharing honest and accurate consumer
experiences. However, incorporating non-disparagement clauses into
consumer contracts would not wholly solve all issues surrounding the
consumer review site bullies, but rather will give some businesses some
leverage. Returning to the CDA's original goal of incentivize service
providers' to delete or otherwise monitor content, the CDA could
require consumer review sites to maintain a straightforward and
immediate option for a reviewed business to remove-or hide from
public view temporarily-any negative review until it confirms that
reviewer actually purchased product or used service. At a minimum,
consumer review sites could conspicuously identify which reviews are
created by "verified users" of the product or service being reviewed, and
which are not. A proof of purchase requirement or receipt code could be
implemented.
This process could be wholly anonymous for the
reviewer, thus not interfering with the reviewer's right to anonymous
speech.
205. Zahed Amin, Exposing Dead Air: Challenging the ConstitutionalSufficiency of Uninsured

Motorist Arbitration Procedures,22 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 527, 553-54 (2007) (other suggested
safeguards are: "(1) adequate and reasonable notice, (2) an impartial decision maker, (3) the
opportunity to present evidence, (4) an opportunity to have witnesses testify under oath, (5) judicial
review, and (6) the opportunity to have legal representation," and (7) discovery to allow claimants to
establish a prima facie claim).
206. Id.at 554-55 (observing the modem trend of a presumption of a valid arbitration award).
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Furthermore, a user review website would not be prohibited from
noting-even highlighting, perhaps with a prominent symbol, flag, or
phrase-that a listed business has a non-disparagement clause in its
terms of service. That acknowledgment may work to delegitimize the
solely positive reviews posted to that business, and solve the underlying
issue of misleading the public. Facebook, Twitter, and social media
would also ensure that the public was well aware of any egregious nondisparagement clauses-while a customer could not post a negative
review, potential customers who were offered the service or product and
refused based on the non-disparagement agreement, could certainly
share their experience of being offended by such a contract term.
People reading the reviews would know that the negative reviews were
not of the actual product or service, but the reviewers distaste for the
business practices. Public perception of a business incorporating a nondisparagement clause as part of its terms and service is bound to make
some businesses pause.
The use of non-disparagement clauses may change the reliability of
consumer review sites but not the reliability of information that actually
reaches the consumer. That is, while businesses that require their
customers to consent to non-disparagement clauses will only have
positive reviews on consumer review sites, with a simple designation
notifying readers that a certain business uses this type of clause in its
terms of service, customers will question why some businesses only
have positive reviews. Better yet, with practical regulations and contract
standards in place to limit the effects of truly false reviews, and realworld response mechanisms to unfair reviews, user review websites will
be motivated to alter their business model.
IV. CONCLUSION

Consumer review sites have not heeded the adage, "with great power
comes great responsibility." Instead, they shelter behind the CDA, antiSLAPP laws, unmasking statutes, and the rhetoric of free speech and
public debate. These justify their policies of inaction in ensuring that
reviews are written by actual customers or their failure to stop abuses by
consumers seeking to intimidate and blackmail small businesses.
Against this backdrop, the commendable objectives of providing a
public stage for individuals to share their experiences with other
consumers and provide honest feedback to businesses have been
distorted, and small businesses are held hostage by the clout that the
anonymous reviewers and consumer review site bullies hold. It is not
that policies of public debate, petition, and an honest customer feedback
loop are not admirable ones worthy to be maintained, but those policies
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are lost in a sea of laws and financial influence stacked against small
businesses. Small businesses have been conscripted into participating in
Permitting these profitable
consumer review sites' profit-model.
consumer review sites to host anonymous reviews with no attempt at
ensuring reviews are written by actual customers of the business being
reviewed is not a public policy to preserve.
Given the legal landscape for small businesses attempting to brawl
with the consumer review site bullies, non-disparagement clauses should
not be subject to a blanket legislative void. Such clauses do not violate
public policy so long as concrete procedural and substantive safeguards
exist, such as those found in other contexts where constitutional rights
are contractually waived. Recently enacted and proposed legislation
that voids non-disparagement provisions in consumer contracts fails to
consider scenarios where a non-disparagement clause in a consumer
Acknowledging the
contract is a justifiable business practice.
importance of free speech, the policies behind the CDA and anti-SLAPP
laws, and the agreed bad public policy of enabling businesses to offer
inferior service while secretly tucking a non-disparagement clause into
their terms of service, non-disparagement clauses in consumer contracts
can be judicially analyzed and enforced under traditional contract law.
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